Who Assassinated Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana

Memorandum on the 1994 Assassination of
Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda
English Translation- December 1999 – Original published in French in July 1999

In collaboration with Organization for Peace, Justice and Development in Rwanda (OPJDR)
Felicien Kanyamibwa, Ph.D.
Email: kanyami@optonline.net

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. History
3. Climate – Spring 1994
3.1 Burundi
3.2 Uganda
3.3 Invasion of Rwanda
3.4 Assassinations in Rwanda
3.5 The Arusha Accord
3.6 Warning Signs
3.6.1 The RPF Battalion
3.6.2 The RPF and the air traffic Corridor
3.6.3 Meeting of the final preparation
3.6.4 Delay Tactics
3.6.5 Dallaire’s Question
3.6.6 Regional Summit of Heads of State on Burundi
4. The Missile Attack on President Habyalimana’s Plane
4.1 The Night of the Assassination
4.2 Different Reactions after the Assassination
4.2.1 Inside Rwanda
4.2.2 Rwandan Patriotic Front
4.2.3 UNAMIR
4.2.4 President Museveni and His Army
4.2.5 The Tanzanian Government
4.2.6 Government of Burundi
5. Regarding the Arsenals Used to Shoot Down the Plane
6. Possible Suspects
6.1 The Burundese Connection
6.2 The Moderate Opposition
6.3 Hutu “Extremists” from the Former Rwandan Government
6.4 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, with Assistance from its Foreign
Allies
6.4.1 Motive
6.4.2 The Plan to Remove Habyiramana
6.4.3 The Means to Shoot the Presidential Plane
7. The Investigation
7.1 The Interim Government
7.2 The RPF Government
7.3 The United Nations Organizations
7.4 Organization of African Unity

7.5 The Belgian Government
7.6 The French Government
7.7 The American Government
7.8 International Civil Aviation Organization
8. Call for an Independent Investigation
8.1 The Trigger Event of the Rwandan Tragedy
8.2 Need for Justice and Fairness
9. Conclusions
10. Abbreviations

1. Introduction
In April of 1994, the small, central African country of Rwanda broke out into an
uncontrollable civil war when hostile missiles shot down its president’s airplane. The
chaos that followed created headlines around the world throughout that summer. The
world was stunned by the violence perpetuated by what the media consistently referred to
as normally peaceful people. Because the shooting of the plane was the trigger that
spiraled Rwanda into chaos and civil war, in order to understand what happened, it is
important to know who triggered these events, and why. However, there has been no
investigation conducted by the UN to uncover the identity of the perpetuators of the
sabotage of the presidential plane. In order to pursue peace and reconciliation in
Rwanda, those who shot down the plane must be revealed and held accountable.
2. History
In order to understand the significance of the events surrounding the downing of
President Habyarimana’s airplane on April 6, 1994, it is crucial to have at least a
fundamental understanding of Rwanda’s history. Rwanda’s population traditionally
consisted of 85% Hutu, 10% Tutsi, and 5% Twa. For nearly four hundred years, Tutsis,
members of the minority ethnic group, headed by a Mwami (king) ruled the majority of
the Hutu ethnic group. The Hutus were treated as “peasants”, and did all of the manual
work. Colonialists (Germany and later Belgium) accepted the status quo, and did not try
to change the fundamental structure of Rwandan society. In early fifties, Hutus began
demanding a better representation in the governing institutions. This led subsequently to
the 1959 social revolution which was accompanied by fighting between the two ethnic
groups. Consequently, an estimated 100,000 Tutsis fled to neighboring countries
including Burundi, Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania. Bloodshed and violence was rampant
during this period. In 1962, Rwanda became independent under their new president,
Gregoire Kayibanda. The latter was member of the Hutu ethnic group. For the first time,
Hutus were permitted to obtain secondary and post-secondary education.
In 1973, a coup established Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana as the new president
Habyarimana who started a relatively peaceful era. Under his rule,Tutsis enjoyed peace
and economical prosperity. It should be noted though, that Habyarimana did not allow
those Tutsis who had fled during the wake of 1959 social revolution to return massively
to Rwanda. The reason put forward was that the country was too small to accommodate
such massive return. In fact, Rwanda is one of the most overpopulated countries in the
world. However, this created tension, and those exiled Tutsis felt, perhaps justifiably, that
they should have had the right to return to their homeland. Meanwhile within Rwanda,
ordinary Hutus and Tutsis went to school together, went to church together, worked side
Assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda
by side, and helped build up an infrastructure that was the envy of that whole region of
Africa.

3. Climate – Spring 1994
In the spring of 1994, when Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, things had become very
tense. The peace, which the country enjoyed since 1973, had become increasingly
fragile, and, by April, Rwanda was like a tinder-box into which the deliberate death of the
president was like someone throwing a match. In order to understand what had created
these new conditions, it is important to look at the political climate of the time, and at
what had taken place in the years prior to 1994.
3.1 Burundi:
Events in neighboring Burundi undermined Hutu/Tutsi relations in Rwanda. Burundi has
a similar ethnic makeup as Rwanda, with 10% Tutsi and 90% Hutu. Burundi gained its
independence in 1962, but was mostly ruled by a military republic. They were not able to
achieve peace between the two tribes. During the 1970’s there were thousands of Hutu
deaths, and again, after a military coup in 1987, there were more serious ethnic clashes.
An example of this, is that in 1972 and 1988, Tutsi soldiers in Burundi’s Tutsi dominated
army, went into the public schools, separated the children by tribe, and massacred all of
the Hutu children in each school that they visited. In 1993, the first democratically
elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected in Burundi. However, in October,
1993, he was assassinated by the monoethnic Tutsi army. This assassination was
regarded by Hutus in Rwanda as a clear indication that the Tutsi minority in Burundi had
the intention of preventing democracy there. Rwandan Hutus did not only have to look to
the past to remember the oppressive rule of the minority Tutsi tribe, they only had to look
at their neighbor to the South to see and fear the oppression which they had escaped in
1959.
3.2 Uganda:
The exiled Tutsi’s whom Habyarimana had not permitted to return to Rwanda, had
largely established themselves in Uganda, the country to the north of Rwanda. They had
helped Uganda’s current president, Yoweri Museveni, depose Present Okello in 1986.
President Museveni was then in the position of owing this group a favor. This group was
mostly composed of Tutsis who fled Rwanda after the 1959 social revolution. This group
of Tutsis in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and, on October 1, 1990,
invaded Rwanda across the northern border, killing and torturing men, women and
children who lived in villages along that border.
3.3 Invasion of Rwanda:

As mentioned above, the exiled tutsis who formed the bulk of President Museveni’s army
invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990. Members of the RPF used Uganda as a base from
which they launched all their attacks on Rwanda. These raids were notorious for their
carnage and cruelty. By 1993, there were an estimated one million Hutu villagers fleeing
these Ugandan-based raids by fleeing towards the interior of Rwanda. At that time, the
population of Rwanda was approximately seven million. This means that, in the spring of
1994, one in seven people in Rwanda were refugees in their own country. Western media
predicted a widespread famine in Rwanda that year due to this large displaced population.
This too, of course, created tension in Rwanda, particularly in the northern area, where
the RPF was attacking from, and where, as a consequence, there was increasing tension
between the local Hutus and Tutsis.
3.4 Assassinations in Rwanda:
-In 1993, Emmanuel Gapyisi, a member of the political bureau of MDR, President of
MDR in Gikongoro, and an active member of a group called “Forum Paix et Democratie”
was assassinated.
-The same year, Fidele Rwambuka, a member of the National Committee of the
Republican National Movement ofr Democracy and Development (MRND), was also
assassinated.
-On February 21, 1994, Felicien Gatabazi, who was both the Executive Secretary of the
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and a member of the Rwandan coalition government, was
gunned down at the entrance of his house.
-The following day, February 22, 1994, Martin Bucyana, the President of the Coalition
for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was assassinated in Butare. There were strong
presumptions among the public that these political assassinations were committed by the
RPF. It is a well known fact that all of these hutu leaders had been opposed to the RPF
and committed to the victory of democracy and republican ideals. There were strong
presumptions among the public that these Hutu leaders were killed by RPF death squads.
Their murders exacerbated differences among political parties, and added to the mistrust
and tension throughout the country.
3.5 The Arusha Accord:
In order to come to a lasting peace, President Habyarimana negotiated a peace accord
with the RPF and various factions of his government. This accord guaranteed the Tutsi
minority a percentage of seats in government within a power sharing arrangement in
running the government. It was controversial, because many Hutus felt that Habyarimana
had given too much to the 10% minority, while members of the RPF did not desire the
full implementation of the agreement because it guaranteed that they would never have
the total control on the governmental affairs. The UN sent on November 1, 1993 a
mission to Rwanda known as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR), to assist in the transition.

3.5 Warning Signs
A document called “Environnement actuel et avenir de l’organisation” outlines an
apparent scenario designed by RPF ideologues and strategists shortly after the signing of
the Arusha accord. The plan was to evict Habyarimana within nine months. A review of
the events following the signing of the agreement seems to support the existence of a
calculated intention to oust Habyarimana.
3.5.1 The RPF Battalion:
On July 20, 1993 in Kinihira, the RPF had requested and obtained the installation of a
battalion in the capital, Kigali. The purpose of this battalion of 600 soldiers was
theoretically to protect RPF officials. This battalion was housed in the building of the
National Council for Development (CND), the Rwandan National Assembly, a strategic
site in the center of Kigali. The RPF requested that all supplies (even wood) be brought
in from Mulindi (territory under RPF occupation). When supplies were coming from
Mulindi, the RPF refused to submit to control at the check point of the territory controlled
by the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). Security feared that they could be bringing in
extra weapons and soldiers, but were unable to prevent it without the cooperation of the
RPF. The Belgian contingent of UNAMIR in charge of escorting these convoys
supported the RPF’s refusal to be checked. The matter was brought to the attention of the
commander of the UNAMIR, General Dallaire, but nothing was done about it.
Later events would confirm that those convoys had indeed helped in smuggling military
equipment and additional reinforcement to the RPF battalion in Kigali, and that the
battalion itself had played the role of a Trojan horse1. Evidence strongly points to the fact
that these supply convoys probably brought in the missiles used to shoot down the
presidential plane. General Dallaire was apparently informed about the existence of these
missiles, but did nothing about them2.
3.5.2 RPF and the air traffic corridor:
In January 1994, the RPF requested that landing approach and take-off at Kanombe
International Airport be prohibited from the downtown corridor of Kigali. It argued that

1 Jacques Bihozagora, a member of the RPF government, later confirmed this analysis on a round table
program broadcast by Radio Rwanda on the anniversary of the eve of the capture of Kigali. He declared
that the battalion’s mission was to “liberate the capital”. Furthermore, Ntaribi Kamanzi, an RPF journalist,
revealed in his book “ Rwanda. Du Génocide à la Défaite”, how two battalions (1200 soldiers selected
from all APR units) had been prepared for urban operations before being sent to Kigali. That is twice the
number who were agreed upon to be in that battalion at the time. Ntaribi Kamanzi in “Du Génocide à la
Défaite” p. 69.
2 Report of the Belgian Parliamentarian Commission for Rwanda, (COM-1-9)

airplanes using this corridor were flying over its military contingent, and therefore, its
security was at risk. In a bold pressure tactic on the government, the RPF battalion
housed in CND actually shot at a Belgian transport airplane, a C130 Hercules,
approaching Kanombe International Airport from downtown Kigali. The plane was not
hit. Although this action clearly contravened the Arusha Peace Accord, The UNAMIR
intervened and pressured the Rwandan government to yield to the RPF request. Finally,
the government gave in and agreed to change the permitted flight approach to the airport.
In retrospect, it appears that this was a tactical move to make it more possible to shoot
down the presidential airplane three months later. It was now possible to shoot at the
plane from one side, Masaka, a rural, covered area with little control3.
3.5.3 Meeting of the final preparation:
It is reported that in March 1994, RPF strategists met in Bobo-Diuolasso, Burkina Faso.
Manzi Bakuramutsa, an employee of the UN Development Program (UNDP), a Zairian
citizen at the time, arranged the meeting. During this high level meeting, the last details
of the plan to physically eliminate President Habyarimana were agreed upon. After its
victory, the RPF appointed Manzi Bakuramutsa ambassador of Rwanda to the UN. He
later served as ambassador to Belgium. Today, he is ambassador to Israel.
3.5.4 Delay Tactics:
On March 25, the RPF refused to attend the inauguration ceremony of the remaining
institutions of the transition. Delays and refusal to cooperate with the implementation of
the Arusha accord followed. Arguing over candidates of other political parties, on
grounds that could not be supported by the Arusha Accord, they significantly delayed the
implementation of the peace accord. Ntaribi Kamanzi recalls this situation in his book
mentioned earlier. He says that when western diplomats based in Kigali went to Mulindi,
the RPF headquarters, in March 1994 to try to persuade the RPF to change its position, a
western diplomat expressed to them his disappointment at their refusal to cooperate4.
While these delays and “foot-dragging” do not in themselves appear significant, they can
be seen as important when viewed from a historical perspective. It is important to note
that while there were opponents to the Arusha Accord on both sides, it was the RPF
contingent that was delaying its implementation. Perhaps they believed that once the
accord was successfully implemented, they would have no justification in the
international forum to wrest the control from the current administration. A logical,
tactical strategy, therefore, would be to delay and sabotage the transition long enough to

3 Refer to the letter of the Falcon 50 Pilot, Appendice of the Mission d’Information Parlementaire
Francaise.
4 Ntaribi Kamanzi in “Du Génocide à la Défaite” pp. 77-78

gain full control of the country without international outrage at replacing a democracy
with military rule. A 10% minority, of course, cannot rule by democracy.
3.5.5 Dallaire’s Question:
On April 3, 1994, the Representative of the UN Secretary General, Roger Booh Booh,
informed President Habyarimana that, according to diplomatic sources, the RPF planned
to assassinate him. The UNAMIR was then informed of the plot to assassinate the
President. The next day, two days before the assassination, during a reception at Hotel
Meridien, General Dallaire asked a rather strange question of Ret. Col. Theoneste
Bagosora. He asked; “Who is the designated successor to President Habyarimana?”
Bagosora replied that he did not know. Although clearly warned of the plot, no apparent
action was taken by General Dallaire and the UNAMIR to prevent the assassination.
Dallaire merely inquired as to the successor.
3.5.6 Regional Summit of Heads of State on Burundi:
On April 6, 1994, the President went to Dar-es-Salaam for a regional summit of Heads of
State on Burundi. There were many warning signs that this summit was a trap. The
summit, originally called to discuss the situation in Burundi, discussed Rwanda’s
situation instead. Its final communiqué has not been published to this day. It was
originally scheduled to be held April 5, 1994, in Arusha, and then was postponed to take
place on April 6 in Dar-es-Salaam. Some of the scheduled participants did not show up
for the summit. Why was the summit called, if it was not significant enough to stay on
the agenda, and to publish its results? Why the changes in agenda, time, place, and
participants? As it was upon flying home from this summit that President Habyarimana’s
plane was shot down, perhaps the answers to these questions will help shed light on that
fateful assassination.
The summit ended later than previously scheduled mainly because of Uganda’s President
Museveni. First, he arrived in Dar-es-Salaam very late. Then, the meeting that was
begun late was unusual. President Museveni slowed down the meeting using multiple
and intemperate digressions. President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira of
Burundi signed the final communiqué at the airport just before embarking. They had
asked to spend the night in Dar-es-Salaam, as their pilot had expressed concern for their
safety on a late flight. However, President Mwinyi, their Tanzanian counterpart, had told
them that no measure had been taken to have them spend the night. They had no choice
but to fly home that night, later than planned, in the dark, and with concerns for their
safety. Despite all of these last minute changes, out of the control of the Rwandan
president, and their later than expected departure, caused in large part by Museveni,
President of Uganda, their assassins were somehow expecting them, waiting in the dark,
on a hillside (on the new air traffic corridor) outside Kigali.

4. The Missile Attack on President Habyarimana’s plane
4.1 The Night of the Assassination:
The airplane with a French crew took off from Dar-es-Salaam Airport at approximately
6:30 PM Kigali time, with the Rwandan and the Burundian delegations aboard.
The Rwanda delegation included:
1. President Juvenal Habyarimana
2. Major-General Deogratias Nsabimana, Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army
3. Ambassador Juvenal Renzaho, adviser in the President’s Office
4. Colonel Elie Sagatwa, the President’s Private Secretary
5. Doctor Emmanuel Akingeneye, the President’s doctor
6. Major Thaddee Bagaragaza
The Burundian delegation included:
1. President Cyprien Ntaryamira
2. Secretary Bernard Ciza
3. Secretary Cyriaque Simbizi
The French crew included:
1. Major Jack Heraud
2. Colonel Jean-Pierre Minaberry
3. Master Sergeant Jean Marie Perrine
At approximately 8:20 PM, local time, the presidential jet was shot down with missiles
fired from a farm located in Masaka in the commune of Kanombe, near the Kigali-to-
Kibungo highway. Of the two missiles shot, one hit the plane. By strange coincidence,
the plane crashed into the courtyard of President Habyarimana’s private residence. All
passengers and crew died immediately.
Earlier that day, a group of soldiers, members of the Belgian contingent led by Lieutenant
Lotin went to the eastern part of the country, the Akagera National Park, to escort RPF
officials. This group of soldiers returned to Kigali in the evening and was given the
assignment to escort Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana to Radio-Rwanda where she
intended to address the nation. It is this group of soldiers who were killed in the military
barrack of Kigali by mutineers on April 7, 19945.

5 Alexandre Goffin published this information in his book “Rwanda 7 Avril 1994: 10 commandos vont
mourir”, page 23. Colonel Luc Marchal and Lieutenant Colonel Dewez, commander of KIBAT later
confirmed it before the Belgian Parliamentary Commission for Rwanda: Report of the Belgian
Parliamentarian Commission for Rwanda, (COM-R-1-15 & 1-72).

4.2 Different Reactions After the Assassination
After the assassination, RPF propagandist and its sponsors spread a story that President
Habyarimana died in an accident. General Dallaire’s statement to this effect led to
confusion and speculation. Dallaire knew that missiles had shot down the airplane.
When RPF propagandists realized that this story would not bear up to scrutiny, they
declared that the President had been killed by Hutu extremists, among them members of
the Akazu (a circle of influential relatives around the President), including Habyarimana’s
wife. Later on, many observers acknowledged that the so-called “Hutu extremists” did
not have the means or the interest in carrying out the assassination. They then suggested
many possible hypotheses. An analysis of different reactions points to serious clues as to
who conducted the assassination.
4.2.1 Inside Rwanda:
On April 6, 1994 around 9:15 PM Radio RTLM announced without any detail that the
presidential jet had been shot down, and promised to provide further information in later
broadcasts. At this time, the death of the President was not confirmed. Radio-Rwanda
announced the President’s death the next morning at 5:30 AM in a communiqué issued by
the Ministry of Defense. In general the population of the capital reacted with anger and
panic. However, some RPF sympathizers could not restrain their joy.
An impromptu meeting including officers of the army and the gendarmerie, the Ministry
of Defense, the military barrack of Kigali, General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Chief of
Staff of the Gendarmerie, and Ret. Col. Theoneste Bagosora, Chief of Staff of the
Ministry of Defense took place at the headquarters of the Rwandan Army on April 6,
1994. The meeting started around 10:00 PM and went on through the night. General
Dallaire, the UNAMIR Commander and Colonel Marchal, head of the Belgian contingent
participated in this meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to take security measures to
prevent possible violence, reassure the population, and preserve peace in this situation of
power vacuum. After this meeting a delegation including Ret. Col. Bagosora and Colonel
Rwabalinda went to meet the Representative of the UN Secretary General, Roger Booh
Booh to seek his advice about how to manage the crisis. General Dallaire accompanied
the delegation.
A meeting, which was suggested by Booh Booh at the US ambassador’s residence, and
which was supposed to include western ambassadors, General Ndindiliyimana, and
Colonel Bagosora did not take place. Only the US ambassador showed up for the
meeting. Others western ambassadors did not show up at the place designated for the
meeting.
As agreed upon during the meeting held the night before at the headquarters of the
Rwandan Army, a meeting of the heads of the Rwandan Armed Forces (the Chief of Staff

of the Gendarmerie, the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense, military officers
assigned to the headquarters of the army and the headquarters of the gendarmerie, field
commanders, commanders of the barracks of the gendarmerie and the army) was held at
the military academy of Kigali. General Dallaire participated in this meeting as well.
This meeting set up a crisis committee with a mission to facilitate contacts with political
leaders in order to fill the power vacuum created by the tragic death of the head of state
and to monitor the security situation in the country.
On the same afternoon, following recommendations made by the Representative of the
UN Secretary General, Roger Booh Booh, the executive committee of MRND held a
meeting. The meeting had been suggested to find a replacement for the President.
However, participants ran into two obstacles: the first obstacle was that the Arusha Peace
Accord did not provide for a replacement of the President before the inauguration of the
institutions of the transition; the second obstacle was that only an MRND convention
could designate a candidate to the Presidency of the Republic. A second meeting became
necessary to overcome these obstacles. This second meeting took place on April 8, 1994.
Representatives from 5 political parties, members of the coalition government (MRND,
MDR, PL, PSD, PDC) participated in this meeting. This meeting concluded an
agreement that supplemented the Convention signed on April 16, 1992. Indeed, on April
8, 1994, Theodore Sindikubwabo, President of the National Assembly (CND) was
designated President of the Republic as provided by the Constitution of June 10, 1991,
and Jean Kambanda was designated Prime Minister. The Interim Government was sworn
in on April 9, 1994.
4.2.2 Rwandan Patriotic Front:
Immediately after the assassination, the RPF battalion housed in CND in Kigali rejoiced
and shouted “final victory”. The headquarters of the RPF at Mulindi was immediately
informed of the death of the President. In his book mentioned above, Ntaribi Kamanzi
says that the RPF battalion housed at CND sent a message announcing the death of the
President to the RPF headquarters at Mulindi around 8:30 PM, just after the
assassination. The same night, in the wake of the assassination, General Kagame made a
declaration of war on Radio Muhabura, the RPF radio station. Around midnight, the
monitoring service of the FAR intercepted a radio message carried by the RPF radio
communication network. In this message, General Kagame informed all military units of
his army of the death of the President, congratulated all the military that had participated
in the assassination, and put on high alert all military units.

On April 7, 1994, the RPF initiated attacks in the capital, Kigali and in northern Rwanda6.
The capital plunged into chaos and panic following the death of their president and the
attack by the RPF. It is in this context that mutineers murdered Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, believing them to be involved in the
missile attack on the presidential jet. On the afternoon of April 7, Rwandan Armed
Forces (FAR) responded to RPF attacks carried out on all military fronts, and in Kigali,
the capital city. The tragic civil war had then begun.
4.2.3 UNAMIR:
The group of soldiers led by Lieutenant Lotin had returned from a mission in Eastern
Rwanda and was at Kanombe International Airport. It was ordered to protect Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and to escort her to Radio-Rwanda to the nation. It is
important to point out that this mission had not been discussed at the meeting held at the
headquarters of the Rwandan Army and in which General Dallaire had participated.
Colonel Marchal confirms this information.
4.2.4: President Museveni and His Army:
On April 7, 1994, the day after the assassination, during the opening of an international
conference held in Kampala, President Museveni could not conceal his satisfaction and
complicity in the assassination. Speaking briefly of the death of President Habyarimana,
he boasted of a mission well done these terms: “It was time to solve the matter.”7
It is not a secret that the Ugandan army actively participated in the major offensive and
provided the RPF with logistics. Estimates say that more than 30,000 Ugandan troops
participated in Rwanda’s “civil” war. President Museveni himself acknowledged
Ugandan army involvement at a summit held in Harare, Zimbabwe on August 9, 19988.
4.2.5 The Tanzanian Government:
When President Habyarimana left Dar-es-Salaam, Capital City of Tanzania in the
evening of April 6, 1994, he left members of his delegation who were supposed to return
to Kigali the next day aboard two Rwandan airplanes (a military North Atlas airplane and
a Twin-Otter of Rwandan Airlines) stationed at the Dar-es-Salaam airport. Without any

6 In fact, in northern Rwanda, the movement of RPF units started before the assassination of the President
and in the capital infiltration originating from the CND intensified in the night of April 6 and April 7, 1994.
On April 8, 1994 RPF troops moving from Northern Rwanda were already in Rutongo (about 7 miles from
Kigali).
7 Africa International No. 272 May 1994, p.7
8 East African Alternatives March/April 1999, p.38-42

explanation, the Tanzanian government did not allow these airplanes to take off from the
Dar-es-Salaam airport. The Rwandan delegation could not return to Kigali. These
airplanes were handed over to Rwanda after the victory of the RPF. Some passengers and
crew members went back to Rwanda, others went into exile.
Even though Habyarimana was assassinated as he was returning from Tanzania, the
president of Tanzania did not send a message of condolences to the people of Rwanda.
This looks particularly significant when one considers that it was he who denied
hospitality to the President when Habyarimana had been concerned about the safety of a
night flight home. Both acts are especially peculiar when one considers that they are not
in line with the african tradition. One cannot help but question his involvement and
motivations.
4.2.6 The Government of Burundi:
Burundi leaders’ attitude towards this assassination is strange. Burundi lost its president,
Cyprien Ntaryamira, and two secretaries in the airplane crash but the Burundese
government reacted to this drama with indifference.
5. Regarding the Arsenals Used to Shoot Down the Plane
After the assassination, the perpetrators left two containers of missile launchers in an
embankment before vanishing. These containers were found on April 25, 1994 by
internally displaced populations, who were resettling in the area (people fleeing from the
violence on the Northern border), and were handed over to the Rwandan Armed Forces
(FAR) the same day.
The FAR had no doubt that the material found on the scene of the crime was what had
been used to perpetrate the assassination. Even though they were not familiar with the
material, it was apparent that the missiles were made in the Soviet Union. The containers
of the missile launchers had a green army Khaki color with the detailed inscriptions.
The inscriptions on the first launcher container are as follows:
9 il322-1-01
9M313-1
04-87
04835
C LOD COMP
911519-2
3555406
The inscriptions on the second launcher container are as follows:

9 il322-1-01
9M313-1
04-87
04814
C LOD COMP
911519-2
5945107
Engineer Lieutenant Munyaneza, a FAR officer, recorded these inscriptions. The missile
launcher containers are significant because they are the only concrete evidence left by the
assassins.
Despite the discovery of the arsenal used to shoot down the plane, and the detailed
inscriptions being immediately recorded, there has been a lot of confusion regarding the
origin and type of missile, and even whether there was indeed a missile attack at all.
Despite the evidence of the wreckage and the discovered arsenal, western media persist in
referring to the downing of the plane as a “mysterious plane crash”. The tracing of the
origin, type, and requisition of the missiles very directly implicates the perpetuators of
the assassination. It is no small wonder that a great deal of misinformation has been
generated around the existence and origin of the weapons used to shoot down the
President’s airplane.
Lieutenant Engineer Munyaneza, who studied engineering in the former USSR, was able
to positively identify the arsenal discovered as missile launchers from the USSR. The
Lieutenant translated and described in detail all relevant information from those arsenals
in a report written on April 25, 19949. Despite this report, written less than three weeks
after the shooting of the plane people have continued to create confusion about this
arsenal.
In his book, “Rwanda: Trois Jours qui on fait basculer l’Histoire”, Professor Reyntjens
alternates terms in describing the arsenal discovered in the farm in the Masaka farm.
Sometimes referring to “missiles”, sometimes “missile launchers”, and sometimes to
“containers” 10. The arsenals that were discovered are not missiles, but containers that are
at the same time missile launchers. In fact, for this type of arsenals, the missile and the
launcher are delivered as one piece and once the missile is fired, the launcher, which
holds the missile becomes a useless container. Obviously, the arsenals discovered did not
have the missiles with them because they had already been fired. It is very clear that
information described on the container is consistent with the missiles utilized to shoot
down the presidential jet. Hence, it is more appropriate to describe the arms that were

9 Appendix of the Mission d’ Information Parlementaire Francaise. p. 265
10 Appendix of the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise p. 256

utilized to commit the crime as missiles and the two arsenals discovered at MASAKA as
the missile launchers. This clarification is therefore necessary and important to remove
any confusion regarding terms utilized to describe the arms that shot down the plane.
A more serious confusion than simple terminology is based upon Professor Reyntjens’
book. This is the confusion regarding the type of missile fired. Without demonstrating
how he came to the conclusion, Professor Reyntjens states: “All we can say with
certitude is that it is a missile of type SAM-16 Gimlet.”11 He maintained this assertion
before the Belgian Parliamentarian Commission for Rwanda without demonstrating any
evidence to his conclusion.
Later, in his letter to the Chairman of the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise,
he attested that the Rwandan Armed Forces, and particularly Ret. Col. Bagosora,
provided the information to him, telling him that the arsenals were of Type SAM-16
Gimlet. As far as we know, the Rwandan Armed Forces, as well as Ret. Col. Bagosora,
have always maintained that they discovered missiles of type SAM-7 and never said they
were missile type SAM-16 Gimlet. Ret. Col. Bagosora sent Professor Reytjens, through
his lawyer, Mr. Luc de Temmerman, a copy of the document written by Lieutenant
Engineer Munyaneza. This document does not talk about missiles or type of missiles at
all but mentions instead missile launchers. The copy sent by Ret. Col. Bagosora is
exactly the same as the one that was cited in documents referred to by the Mission
d’Information Parlementaire Francaise12. Adding to the confusion by basing their
information on Professor Reyntjens’ work, the French commission shows a photograph of
a missile launcher (type SAM-16 Gimlet), and affirms that witnesses who found the
missile launcher identified the picture as being the same as the one discovered on the
farm on Masaka13. However, farmers and people who uncovered the arsenal at Masaka
consistently deny the French commission picture as being authentic.
The confusion between the types of missile is important because the Ugandan army, the
established arm suppliers of the RPF, did not have any type SAM-16, and had only type
SAM-7. Although all evidence, witnesses and inscriptions, point to the fact that the
missiles fired were type SAM-7, Professor Reyntjens maintains that the missiles were
type SAM-16, and uses this evidence to exonerate the RPF of the assassination: “ the
missiles belonging to the RPF, were coming most probably from the Ugandan Army
inventory; however, the latter has only SAM-7, and not SAM-16, most likely utilized to
shoot down the plane14.” Another writer, Colette Braeckman, also ignores witnesses and

11 Philip Reyntjens. “Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’Histoire” p. 45
12 The Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise. T II, annexes, p. 265
13 Appendix of the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francais p. 265
14 Letter of Philip Reyntjens of December 10, 1998 to Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, Chairman of the Mission
d’Information Parlementaire Francaise, included in the appendices of the Report.
17
serial inscriptions to draw her own conclusions about the type of missile used:
“Regarding, the assassination attempt itself, it was confirmed that it was a well prepared
military operation, carried out by specialists of high flights and that the arsenal used has
probably been a mobile SAM missile of serial Strela.”15 Both conclusions are not
factually based, and are used to exonerate the RPF from the assassination of President
Habyarimana.
The confusion used in shooting down the presidential jet still persists. It runs a risk of
misleading any future investigation. One would maintain that only a logical fact-finding
mission, based on eyewitness accounts, and the inscriptions recorded, conducted by
ballistic experts, should be able to draw conclusive results.
6. Possible Suspects
Professor Reyntjens, the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise, and the Belgian
Parliamentarian Commission for Rwanda all investigated the assassination, and all
developed lists of who could be behind the shooting down of the presidential jet. Each
developed a list of suspected groups who could have the motive to get rid of
Habyarimana. While the wording of each is different, the groups are fundamentally the
same. The four possible suspects are:
1. The Burundese connection;
2. Moderate opposition; the democratic coup that went horribly wrong, possibly
with the help of the RPF;
3. Hutu extremists from the former Rwandan regime, working with the army, and
possibly the help of French operators;
4. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), with assistance from the Belgian military
Each investigation leans more heavily on various information, and none succeeds in
coming to a convincing conclusion. The result of these investigations is a sense of
further confusion. At this point, it is important to take a step further by putting all these
hypotheses together and to proceed by eliminating improbable hypotheses that are
essentially misleading.
6.1 The Burundese Connection:
Regional experts, as well as both commissions quoted above, have disqualified the
Burundian lead. We think that their analysis and results are absolutely correct.
6.2 The Moderate Opposition:

15 Colette Braeckman, “Rwanda. Histoire d’un Génocide” p. 196

No one among the moderate opposition has yet demonstrated motivation or technical
ability to conduct such an operation. Furthermore, key players in the opposition, such as
Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, the designated Prime Minister, have expressed their strong
views regarding the assassination issue16. Regarding the possibility of a conspiracy
between the RPF and the opposition, the latter would almost certainly have been led by
the RPF and not the other way around. This would lead us back to hypothesis #4, which
shall be reviewed shortly.
If we eliminate the first two hypotheses, we are left with two main possibilities: the Hutu
“extremists”, and the RPF. These are the two main leads upon which most opinions tend
to agree. In investigating which of these groups may have done the assassination, the
most relevant questions to be asked are: “Who benefits from the crime?” 17, and “Who
had the means to carry out the assassination?”. In other words, it is important to
determine who had the means and the motive.
6.3 Hutu “Extremists” from the former Rwandan Government:
Did the closest people to President Habyarimana have any interest to kill him? Nothing
is sure. Detractors of Habyarimana and his entourage seem to believe that his closest
allies, who wanted to remain in power, because they feared losing their privileges, may
have killed him. Was the death of Habyarimana itself a guaranty to remain in power and
keep their privileges? Their detractors believe the answer is yes. The President
supporters affirm that Habyarimana had given up many concessions that Hutu extremists,
as well as his closest people, could neither accept nor tolerate. According to this analysis,
Habyarimana was killed to avoid handing the power to the RPF.
This hypothesis is not supported by the facts and chain of events before and after the
signature of Arusha peace accord. In fact, the alliance between RPF and the Democratic
Forces for Change (DFC) had been severely damaged after many confrontations, mostly
resulting from the hegemonic behavior of the RPF that had reached its critical phase after

16 Declaration of Faustin Twagiramungu before the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise
17 It is curious to see how most analysis done on this topic and many testimonies that have had large
audiences didn’t highlight this question. Of the reports from various sources, such as the one from Rene
Degni Segui, Special envoy of United Nations Human Rights Commission, from experts of United Nations,
from Belgian Parliamentarian Commission for Rwanda, from the Mission d’Information Parlementaire
Francaise or numerous individual opinions expressed publicly here and there, or books written in a rush,
none has conducted a deep analysis with regards to whom this assassination may have benefited.
Some have made reserves in drawing conclusions regarding the author of the crime, hinting that they knew
who it was (Rene Degni Segui, the experts), others have drawn some ambiguous conclusions (Belgian and
French Commissions referred to above), others have tried to push the analysis to the RPF lead without
expressing an explicit opinion (Philip Reyntjens), others have finally mad the decision to put the crime on
the backs of the Hutus without any prior research or analysis (Alison DesForges).

the 1993 offensive. A large number of people from the DFC had come to believe that the
main goal of the RPF was essentially using DFC as a stepping-stone18 to achieve its
objective of gaining total political power. The great majority of the opposition had then
switched their alliance. This did not depend on Habyarimana. Therefore, to assassinate
Habyarimana, in these conditions, was not in the interest of the RPF’s opponents.
Furthermore, many observers have noted that those so-called “Hutu extremists”, both
civilian and military, were not ready to take power. In fact, the assassination of President
Habyarimana seems to have taken them by surprise, as most of them were seeking refuge
from day one after the assassination. Some went to the French Embassy to be evacuated
overseas, while others chose to hide in their homes under army and police protection,
anxiously waiting for the next news and events highlights. No organized group emerged
to take control of the situation and hence benefit from the sudden power vacuum. It is
apparent that no plan was in place, even though rumors about the President’s
assassination had circulated for sometime before the actual event. Surely, if this group
had orchestrated the assassination, indicators after the event would show a certain level of
preparedness on their part. Instead, all indications point to the fact that they were caught
by surprise.
An objective analysis does not lead one to think that Habyarimana’s closest people, or
Hutus that western media call “extremists”, had any interest to loose a leader who
obviously was in a position to better challenge RPF, and had good chances of winning the
presidential election that was supposed to take place at the end of the transitional period.
No other political figure had emerged as a potential replacement of President Juvenal
Habyarimana in case he disappeared or was prevented from participating in the elections.
There were various political wings among Hutus for whom coming up with a consensus
on one leader was a distant dream. In any case for MRND supporters, Habyarimana was
the charismatic figure with who winning presidential elections was an almost-guaranteed
outcome. No one then could have foreseen any successful short-term political future
without Habyarimana. His relatives and his closest entourage did not have any guarantee
of keeping their power and privileges in case of the President death, or even if one of
their own replaced him. The motive for this group appears to be very flimsy.
The means to organize and conduct this operation also seem to have been limited for this
particular group. The Rwandan army did not have the means to conduct such an
operation. Its key leaders were either killed or out of the country. The Defense Minister,
as well as the bureau chief of the military intelligence, was in Cameroon; the army chief
of staff was on the peace mission trip with the President, and hence perished in the same
crash; the chief of military operations at the army headquarters was on a long term
assignment in Egypt; and the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie was himself on vacation.

18 Testimony in the Affair No ICTR-95-I-T, the Prosecutor against Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, transcript of November 5, 1998, p. 70

Who could then have prepared this coup of force besides the army and police? No
organized group has shown the capacity in the past for conducting an operation such as
the one that killed Habyarimana.
Also important, in looking at who might be behind the assassination, is the summit that
Habyarimana had attended directly prior to his assassination. The last minute change of
agenda, location and timing are suspicious enough, that one wants to look at who had the
opportunity in this meeting. The group labeled today as Hutu extremists did not have the
control or the means to determine the date or location for the summit, and their
participation in the meeting itself only lasted one day. Also out of the control of the “Hutu
extremists”, was the fact that President Museveni of Uganda, openly allied with the RPF,
influenced the events of the day by arriving late, and slowing down the proceedings. Nor
would they have influenced Tanzania’s President to refuse hospitality to Habyarimana,
and then to seize the two smaller planes traveling with him, and not return them until the
RPF was in power.
Another point that needs to be underlined is the fact that advocates of the
”Hutu extremist” hypothesis do not show how the assassins could have had the technical
expertise required to shoot down the Presidential plane. The missiles that shot down the
plane were unknown to the Rwandan army and none of the military personnel had prior
knowledge of how to manipulate such an arsenal. Needless to say, the civilians were not
capable of conducting that operation. The report of the Mission d’Information
Parlementaire Francaise leads one to believe that there were some missiles found by the
RPF, when they defeated the Rwandan army, that had never been utilized. This implies
that the Rwandan army may have used missiles to shoot down the presidential plane.
However, the mission only speculates from ambiguous, sometimes contradictory
information provided by the French intelligence. No one from Mission d’Information
Parlementaire Francaise has seen those missiles. No personnel from the Rwandan Army
were trained to use these missiles. But detractors of the Rwandan Army and Hutus
opposed to the RPF, affirm that mercenaries may have used these missiles. Findings
show that there is no evidence of the presence of mercenaries in Rwanda. The idea was
brought up by Colette Braeckman19, and has not been taken seriously by objective
observers.
Lastly, it is important to highlight the fact that if this group wanted to assassinate the
President, they would not have had to take such a drastic approach as shooting his plane,
because they were close to him, and had access to him. They could have used many
available opportunities to assassinate him in such a way as to take the RPF by surprise
and prevent them from reacting as quickly to the assassination as they did with his
airplane crash.

19 Colette Braeckman, “Rwanda: Histoire d’un génocide”. Fayard, Paris 1994, pp. 188, 189

It appears clear that no objective element works in favor of the thesis of the assassination
of President Habyarimana by Hutu extremists, either civilian or military. They did not
have a logical motive, they did not have the means, and they did not benefit from the
death of the president.
6.4 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, with assistance from its foreign allies
We have now shown that the assassination was probably not carried out by any of the
first three possible groups listed by the French and the Belgian commissions. This leads
to the last possibility: the RPF. Did they have the motive and the means to carry out such
an act? Did they benefit from the assassination? Is there any evidence that would lead
one to conclude that is was indeed the RPF who shot down the plane? These questions
are crucial when investigating their possible involvement.
6.4.1 Motive:
Some people state that RPF did not have the motive to assassinate Habyarimana because
the Arusha accord was already going to give them a percentage of parliamentary seats
that was highly disproportionate to its national political representation20. However, while
the Arusha accord did give the RPF some power, it did not give them all the power. If the
Arusha accord were allowed to be implemented, the RPF would be virtually guaranteed
that the Tutsi minority would never have a chance to monopolize the political power as it
did before 1959. It is well documented that many among the RPF supporters felt that as
the traditional rulers of Rwanda, they should not settle for power sharing. Their goal was
100% control. Therefore, if Habyarimana has been allowed to complete the transition
period as stated in the Arusha accord, they would never have realized their goal. But if he
were prevented from implementing it, they might have an opportunity. Particularly if he
were prevented in such a way as to disrupt the stability of the country and allow them the

20 Even Alison DesForges, a great supporter of the RPF over the years, has recognized that the RPF
obtained sharing way over its expectations from the Arusha Accord. Testimony of Alison Desforges in the
affair No. ICTR-96-4-T, the Prosecutor against Jean-Paul Akayesu, audience of May 22, 1997, pp.44-45.
According to Guichaoua, the “Arusha Peace Accord…gives to RPF and its allies from inside the country a
preeminence that is not consistent with its political representation on the ground”. Testimony in the Affair
No. ICTR-95-I-T, the Prosecutor against Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, transcript of November
5, 1998, p. 65

opportunity to gain control. This presents a very strong motive to assassinate the
president21.
Compounding this motivation was the fact that the RPF had worked with other
opposition groups, such as MDR and PL, to gain influence and to control a larger block
of seats in parliament. However, these groups had begun to suspect that they were being
misled, and saw signs which hinted to the real RPF intention: gaining full political power.
These suspicions led to scissions between the RPF and within these opposition parties.
With the assistance of these political parties, the RPF could have controlled 30% of the
seats in parliament, but without them, its influence had greatly waned. This prospect of
loosing control could further have motivated the RPF to make a last desperate grab for
before the Arusha Peace Accord could have fully been implemented.
6.4.2 The plan to remove Habyarimana:
Despite statements to the contrary22, after the signing of the Arusha accord, the RPF
realized that their time was limited, and that they had to move quickly to oust
Habyarimana23. After concluding on the necessity to remove Habyarimana, the RPF
decided on the means to conduct the despicable act. Reliable sources indicate that since
Assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda
21 People who subscribe to this theory point to indicators of their motivation such as certain written
documents declaring their intention to gain full control, stalling tactics during the transitional process even
though the Arusha accord was favorable to their side, the fact that they continued and even stepped up their
offensive in Northern Rwanda during the transition, and even to the fact that the RPF were strongly
suspected of having been behind the assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu president.
In its October 1st, 1990 attack, it was expecting to conduct a quick war up to Kigali hoping to capture it in
three days. When its troops failed to achieve that goal, on October 30, 1990, it changed its military
strategy, opting for a guerrilla war. But its goal remained the same, which is to take power by force. All
objective observers align their opinions in the belief that the RPF are simply opposed to Hutu control of
power. People such as African Rights, Colette Braekman, Alison DesForges, Andre Guichaoua
acknowledge this fact. The Arusha negotiations appear to have been a diversion to make people believe
that the RPF was in favor of a negotiated peace that was not imposed by arms. It is in this context that Mr.
Guichaoua writes, “…for the RPF, the aim of negotiations was essentially to obtain departure of French
troops and finally, to free up some ground for an eventual military offensive”. Testimony in the Affair No
ICTR-95-I-T, the Prosecutor against Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, transcripts of November 5,
1998, p.60.
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in “Rwanda. Le mythe du génocide tutsi planifié à l’épreuve de la justice
internationale.”. Arusha, October 1998 (unpublished)
22 Testimony of Allison Desforges in front of the TPIR, affair No ICTR No ICTR-96-4-T, the Prosecutor
against Paul Akayesu, transcripts of the audience of 22 May, 1997, p.44
23 The RPF document entitled “Situation Actuelle et Perspectives à court terme” describes the plan to
eliminate Habyarimana in these terms: “The non-respect of the Arusha agreement and the re-composition
of the government by discarding by the military and popular force Habyarimana and his supporters, within
a given time frame not to exceed nine months from the date of the signature of the accord. Redefinition of
the Transition: Organization of elections at the time judged the most suitable by the RPF”.

November 1993, there was a “death squad” in Kigali with instructions to eliminate the
President as well as some high ranking officers and civil servants24.
Four important politicians within the government were assassinated within a few months
of the signing of the Accord25. As well, there were several aborted attempts to assassinate
Habyarimana during this period. These attempts were prevented due to the vigilance of
the Presidential guards. It is apparently after the death squad failed to carry out the
assassination of the President, that the plan to shoot the presidential jet was devised.
6.4.3 The means to shoot the Presidential plane:
On January 5, 1994, intelligence sources received a report that the RPF battalion in
Kigali, due to lack of vigilance by the UN Belgian contingent, had enough reinforcement
personnel in the battalion as well as an arsenal of heavy weapons that far exceeded the
limit agreed upon in the Arusha Accord26. Reports included the existence of a missile
SAM-7 being held by this battalion27. It is also known that the RPF had trained
personnel who had the technical capacity to use missiles28. Finally, they had, through
their unorthodox protests, managed to arrange a flight path that conveniently approached
Kigali by passing a remote hillside.
As well as having the military supplies and technical capabilities, the RPF also had
influence with Uganda’s President Museveni. He was indebted to them for their
assistance in his rise to power, and yet would surely have been uncomfortable with this
foreign military force based on his soil. It was in his interest to return the “favor” and to

24 A message of the RPF, obtained December 28 1993 by the government intelligence service, reported that
“the general objective is to arrest important personalities of the Juvenal [Habyarimana] regime and
physical liquidations of a number of military and civilian authorities, with the date and orders fixed. … the
list of victims will be sent to you later, but the number one is well known!”
25 Some messages obtained by intelligence services in the month of December 1993, and in January 1994,
confirm that the intention of the RPF was to provoke chaos like that of Burundi through a series of
assassinations, including that of President Habyarimana.
26 It was believed that these extra troops and arsenals were smuggled in through the shuttles for supplies in
the North that the RPF had been uncooperative about allowing to be searched. The Colonel Marshall, who
commanded the Belgian contingent of the MINUAR, confirmed the infiltration of the RPF army in the
capital during the course of these shuttles. He told the Commission of Investigation of the Belgian Senate:
“I have always been convinced that, when the RPF wanted to find heating wood in the north, it was to
bring some arms. Everything was tried to control that, but in vain.” Report of the Commission of
Investigation of the Belgian Senate, Annexe 1, p. 197
General Dallaire himself stated: “…my staff and troops were not always 100 percent vigilant”. Proceedings
in Jean-Paul Akayesu trial at ICTR, 25 February, 1998, p.52
27 Mr. Stephen Kapimpina-Katenta-Apuuli, the ambassador of Uganda in Washington, and Innocent
Bisangwa-Mbungiye, private Secretary of President Museveni, were arrested in Orlando, Florida in August
1992, while fraudulently buying missiles for the RPF.
28 The RPF shot down RAF planes on several occasions during the war in the north between 1990 and
1993. A reconnaissance aircraft was shot on October 7, 1990; a type Gazelle helicopter was shot October
23, 1990; a type Ecureuil helicopter was shot on Mrch 13, 1993.

get the RPF out of his own country. Museveni was key in organizing the conference, and
was directly responsible for the late closing. He could easily have deliberately assisted in
the last minute changes of location and in the refusal of Tanzania’s President to grant
Habyarimana hospitality for the night. It is interesting to remember that the day
following the assassination, he implied his involvement by stating publicly; “Something
had to be done”.
Finally, the RPF had a clear plan that night. The RPF headquarters in Mulindi were
informed immediately, almost simultaneously, of Habyarimana’s death. They had extra
troops and ammunitions on hand. The battalion within Kigali and in Northern Rwanda
immediately began an offensive attack. Unlike the Hutu “extremists”, the RPF did not
appear scattered, and taken by surprise. An army with an estimated 20,000 soldiers
moved in with rapid efficiency29. The chaos sparked that night ultimately enabled the
RPF to have an excuse to resume the war.
7. The Investigation
7.1 The Interim Government (April 9, 1994 to July 14, 1994):
From its investiture, the interim government, led by Jean Kambanda, Prime Minister,
contacted UNAMIR insisting on the imperative necessity of conducting an independent
international investigation in order to determine clearly the circumstances surrounding
the shoot down of President Habyarimana’s airplain, which led to the death of two Heads
of state, Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, as well as
about ten of their close advisers.
The verbal request was followed by a letter dated May 2, 1994, addressed to the Prime
Minister of the Interim Government from General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the
UNAMIR, confirming the UNAMIR’s disposition to “set up an international Commission
of Inquiry”. In the same letter, Gen. Dallaire asked the Prime Minister to name countries
the Rwandan government would wish to include in that Commission as well as to
eventual modalities. In his letter dated May 7, 1994, the Prime Minister of the Interim
Government replied to General Dallaire to whom he forwarded all the requested
information. This correspondence did not have any follow up.

29 Later on, the RPF tried to justify the war resumption by the necessity to stop the massacres, but in reality,
when the war started anew, there were no massacres except those of the RPF in the buffer zone. Amnesty
International reports: “The information coming (among others), of Rwandese ocular witnesses indicates
that some hundreds, indeed some thousands of civilians not armed and of opponents of the RPF made
prisoners have been summarily executed or killed in a deliberate manner or arbitrary, since the renewed
outbreak of the massacres and of the other acts of violence which the death of the former President Juvenal
Habyarimana, the 6 of April 1994. Numerous homicides are registered in a cycle of arbitrary reprisals
exercised in the North-East of the country, sometimes early before the 6 of April 1994, and targeting
essentially some groups of civilian Hutus”. Rwanda. The Rwandan Patriotic Army Responsible for
Homicides and Disappearances.

It is important to note that without international assistance, the interim government did
not have any experts capable of conducting such investigation. In addition, the inquiry
needed to be independent. Finally, it is worth noting that the RPF suddenly resumed the
war. Therefore it was almost impossible for the Interim Government to conduct even a
preliminary investigation. Only an independent commission with security guarantees
from both warring parties would have been able to conduct such an investigation.
7.2 RPF Government (July 19, 1994 to this day)
Once in power, there was never a move on the part of the RPF to investigate the
assassination of the Presidential jet. They have stated on many occasions that they
believe the culprits are members of the rwandan armed forces (RAF), with the complicity
of Habyarimana’s entourage, being assisted by the French military or mercenaries. One
would assume that if their enemies, the “extremist” Hutus, had done this act, that the RPF
would have been only too eager to uncover evidence to prove their guilt. This would also
justify RPF holding on power without being democratically elected. Instead, when the
new minister of justice (a Hutu), Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, tried to set up an
investigation, he was surprised to find out that the new government was opposed to
investigating the assassination30.
Even if, for the sake of discussion, one admits that the investigation was not a priority for
a government made of people who wanted for a long time to remove President
Habyarimana, it is difficult to understand after five years why no action has been taken
to elucidate the circumstances surrounding the death of the heads of state of two
countries. Instead, high-ranking authorities of the present Rwandan administration have
relentlessly engaged in destroying all evidence of the investigation requested by the
government of Burundi.
When the government of Burundi officially asked the new Rwandan government to
investigate the death of President Cyprien Ntaryamira (who was also on the plane), the
President and Vice-President’s office of the Republic of Rwanda reacted by assigning the
Justice minister, Mr. Nkubito, to send a letter to the special representative of the United
Nations, Mr. Shahiyaar Khan, requesting UN intervention. It appears that the RPF not
only had the means, motive, and opportunity to carry out this assassination, they also
seem to have some motivation for not pushing for an independent inquiry. It should be
noted, that Hutu “extremists” and those close to the former regime, have requested an
Assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda
30 Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu testified: “Myself, when I was still Prime Minister, raised the question of an
international inquiry on that attempt during the council of Ministers, and the Vice-President and minister of
the defense responded to me that this inquiry was not a priority for the country and that no inquiry of this
kind has been undertaken for the other assassinated Rwandese”. Testimony before the Mission
d’Information Parlementaire Francaise, May 12, 1998

investigation, desiring to be cleared of any involvement in the shooting down of the
President’s plane. These requests have all been turned down31.
7.3 United Nations Organization:
In his letter dated May 2, 1994, General Dallaire gave hope to the Rwandan Interim
Government that an international investigation on the conspiracy against President
Habyarimana’s jet would soon take place. However, the same general refused the offer
made as early as April 7, 1994 for a preliminary investigation. He responded that he
would require an American opinion first.
The hope raised by the May 2 1994 letter has for long since vanished because no
investigation has been set up by the UN. The Security Council, in a limited request, asked
the Secretary General, to “collect all information relevant to the affair by all means 32 at
his disposal.” Nevertheless, despite the reminder, the request was never carried out.
Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), set up by the
United Nations on November 8, 1994, has not yet investigated the assassination of
President Habyarimana. Since the president death triggered the chaos that followed, it
would seem crucial to determine who was behind this tragic event that sparked the
horrible violations of the international humanitarian law that this Tribunal has the
mandate to investigate.
7.4 Organization of African Unity (OAU):
The Organization of African Unity, under the leadership of its Secretary General Salim
Ahmed Salim, friend of Uganda’s President Museveni, the most important supporter of
RPF in its war against the former Rwandan government, has supported the Tutsi rebellion
since October 1990. The OAU has never denounced the assassinations of Presidents
Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntalyamira of Burundi, or even offered its condolences to
their families and to the Interim Government.
The OAU set up a commission to look into the causes and the consequences of the 1994
rwandan tragic events. The commission was headed by the former President of
Botswana M. Keturnile Masire, Chairman of the Commission. The latter declared that the
Assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda
31 The position of the RPF and Kigali’s authorities has been recently confirmed by Tito Rutaremara,
Member of the Legislative Assembly and RPF extremist ideologist, during the latest commemorative
anniversary of the Tutsi genocide celebrated in Rwanda. His interview appeared in the governmental
newspaper “Imvaho Nshya” No. 1278 of April 5-11, 1999
32 Security Council Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994 asked the Secretary General to: “collect all
information regarding who bears the responsibility of the tragic incident which causes the death the
Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi”

Commission would not change anything which has been said on these events but would
rather draw lessons aimed at avoiding such tragedies in the future. However, it is clear
that this Commission had no intention to investigate the assassination of President
Habyarimana. The Commission did not seem to be interested in the truth which might
have been uncovered by an independent investigation. It appeared to prefer to rely on
accounts made by the supporters of the current government of Rwanda. This leaves the
impression that the OAU wants to cover up a number of identities and countries involved
in this conspiracy.
7.5 The Belgian Government:
One would think that the Belgian government would be interested in this investigation in
order to find proof which refutes the accusations of complicity made by RPF towards
Belgian soldiers who were part of the UNAMIR contingent. However, no official move
has ever been made to remove suspicion of Belgian involvement.
The Commission of the Belgian Senate did not choose to investigate the implication of
Lieutenant Lotin and his team. The latter, as mentioned above, carried out an
unauthorized mission in Kagera National Park, escorting RPF members for a purpose
that has not yet been clarified. This mission happened to return at the same time that the
Presidential jet was shot down, and also happened to be in the location from which the
fatal missile was fired. These coincidences cast a strong shadow of suspicion upon the
Belgian’s involvement. However, the parliamentary commission would not clarify
contradictory information regarding the number of Belgian peacekeepers killed in Camp
Kigali (army barracks) April 7, 1994. Some of the witnesses who appeared before the
Commission mentioned a number of 10, others 11, while others report the accurate figure
of 16 bodies of peacekeepers, including 2 Moroccans, whose autopsies were made in
Nairobi33. Analysts are of the opinion that among the slain peacekeepers were
mercenaries hired to assassinate President Habyarimana. Their identities have never been
disclosed.
Finally, The Commission of Belgian Senate has not explained why there was a C130
Belgian Hercules equipped with an anti-missile warning system34 that followed the
presidential jet on its fatal flight.
7.6 The French Government:

33 Testimony of Father Guy Theunis before the Belgian Parliamentary Commission for Rwanda (COM-R
1-68).
34Report of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission for Rwanda (COM-R 1-63).

France lost three citizens due to the assassination of the President of Rwanda, but seems
to have adopted a “wait and see” attitude. Right after the tragic event, the French army
offered to investigate the downing of the presidential jet but General Dallaire declined
and said that he would refer the matter to the Americans first. However, nothing indicates
that the Government of France ever officially requested that investigation. It appears that
the French government was waiting for the UN initiative. France has not even asked the
Secretary General what steps he has taken to comply with the Security Council
instructions on this matter.
7.7 The American Government:
The American government has not expressed any intention to seek an investigation into
this tragic event. Some analysts imply that the American government was behind the
scenes to prevent any initiative that could lead to an independent investigation of this
matter. These analysts are of the opinion that if the US wanted an investigation, it would
have taken place long time ago, either under the UN or under the auspice of an
independent international commission. Of course, as the only world superpower, the US
could assert great influence on the new government in Kigali to co-operate with an
independent investigation if they chose to do so.
7.8 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
Through the United Nations and UNAMIR, the Interim Government had officially asked
the ICAO to conduct an investigation. This matter was then placed on the agenda of
April 25, 1994 but no investigation was ever initiated35. In its letter dated March 28, 1996
to the Regional Representative of the ICAO, the RPF government has only requested an
inquiry limited to the presidential jet.
The Organization has never shown an interest in this matter, although this event is
covered the IOAC mandate. No information is available that the Organization ever acted
on the RPF government request. One gets the impression that either the IACO does not
want to be involved in such a highly political issue, or that it has been secretly prevented
from taking any action. It therefore appears that all the involved governments were not
interested in the investigation, with the exception of the Interim Government, headed by
Jean Kambanda.
8. Call for an Independent Investigation
8.1 The trigger event of the Rwandan Tragedy:

35 Report of the Mission d’Information Parlementaire Francaise, T I p. 234

Analysts are unanimous in consider the assassination of President Habyarimana to be the
event which sparked the massacres and the resumption of the war.
The UN Special Reporter, René Degni Segui, was the first to mention this in his
preliminary report dated June 28, 1994. This statement was not revised in subsequent
reports36. In its preliminary report, the Special Reporter says; “the accident of April 6,
1994 which killed the President of Republic of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, seems to
be the immediate cause of painful and dramatic events the country is going through right
now.” Further in the same report, he added; “the attack against the presidential jet has to
be investigated by the Special Reporter as long as there might be collusion between the
assassination instigators and the perpetrators of the massacres”. However, he did not
conduct any investigation before his removal as the UN Special Reporter for Rwanda. He
was reassigned at the insistence of the RPF government that found him too critical.
In their report, the UN experts have also noted that “this catastrophe has triggered
planned violations of human rights…37” They did not make any effort to uncover the
assassins of the Presidents who would therefore be linked to the massacres.
According to Filip Reyntjens “ it was extremely important for us to determine who shot
down the president Habyarimana’s plane that was the spark that set off the flame of
genocide and sent Rwanda spiraling into the whole impasse the country found itself
today.38” According to Guichaoua “…the downing of the presidential jet … is certainly a
decisive action which, from that moment, sparked the next dramatic events as things
unfolded… and I think whoever took the initiative led the country into tragedy ..39”
Other observers think that without President Habyarimana’s assassination, it would have
been difficult to find an excuse to carry out massacres of that scale and to resume the war.
The spirit of the Arusha Agreement would have prevailed without the assassination. Most
Rwandans, whether close to the opposition or the supporters of the late President, are in
agreement on this point. Only RPF supporters favor the thesis of a planned genocide by
Hutus, although even they recognize that the assassination of the President triggered the
massacres. It is therefore imperative to investigate the events surrounding this
assassination, since it surely has something to do with the massacres.

36 Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/7 of June 28, 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/12 Aug. 12, 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/70
Nov. 11 1994.
37 Doc. S/1994/1405 of December 9, 1994.
38 Testimony of Filip Reyntjens dans l’affaire No. ICTR-95-I-T, the Prosecutor vs. Georges Rutaganda,
Court Transcripts October 13, 1997, p. 17.
39 Testimony of André Guichaoua in the case No. ICTR-95 I-T, The Prosecutor vs. Clement Kayishema and
Obed Ruzindana, Court Transcripts November 15, 1997, pp. 156-157.

8.2 Need for Justice and Fairness
It is absolutely necessary to conduct an investigation into the downing of President
Habyarimana’s plane for two reasons; first, in order to have justice for the victims of the
massacres, and secondly, to uncover the real assassins which will vindicate those who are
currently wrongfully accused of committing this crime. All Hutus who oppose the RPF
have been labeled “genociders”, and subsequently hunted down by the RPF government
in Kigali and its allies.
After the RPF victory, the Rwandan prisons were rapidly overpopulated, and other
detention centers were improvised in public buildings such as schools, communal offices,
centers which were previously devoted to development initiatives. Even tents provided
by humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC)
serve as corrections facilities.
It looks like that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been set up
to try Hutus only, while Tutsis, especially RPF members, who have been accused of
similar crimes have not been indicted. It is important to note that the ICTR has not found
it relevant to conduct a full investigation of the assassination, and has chosen, rather, to
endorse the RPF version of events. The RPF maintains that Hutu “extremists”, and those
close to Habyarimana, planned and carried out the President’s assassination and
subsequent massacres. It is our hope that this paper has shed some doubt on the RPF
version of events, and that the reader is compelled to actively search for the truth, rather
than accepting, at face value, the story that has been widespread in the international
media.
9. Conclusions
In conclusion, we know that the shooting down of the plane triggered widespread chaos
and bloodshed throughout Rwanda. Tragically, huge numbers of civilian Tutsis, with no
affiliation to the RPF, were killed in the wave of panic and hatred that swept the country.
Also, and not acknowledged, huge numbers of Hutu civilians were killed as the RPF
gained control of each region. The Hutu massacres continued in the “safety” of the
refugee camps and continue within Rwanda to this day. There is no question that
countless civilians have been massacred by both sides of this civil war. The questions
that are outstanding are; Was this war planned? Was there a planned genocide? And,
who was behind killing the President and subsequently triggering these maasacres at
great scale and resuming the war? The key to answering these questions lies in
discovering the perpetrators of the Presidential assassination. Without an independent
investigation into these facts, there can be no truth and reconciliation within Rwanda.
This investigation could be organized either under the UN or under any other neutral
international body.

10. Abbreviations
ANT : Assemblee Nationale de Transition
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army
AR: Armee Rwandaise (rwandan armed forces)
CDR Coalition pour la Defense de la Democratie
ICRC International Committee of Red Cross
CND Conseil National pour le Developpement (National Assembly)
HQ Headquarter of the Armed Forces
EM-AR Etat Major de l’Armee Rwandaise
EM-Gdn Etat Major de la Gendarmerie
ESM Military Academy
FAR Rwandan Armed Forces
DFC Democratic Forces for Change
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
KIBAT Kigali Battalion (Belgian Contingent of the MINUAR)
MDR Republican Democratic Movement
MINADET Ministry of Defense
MINUAR United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
MRND Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le
Developpement
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
UNO United Nations Organization
OAU Organization of African Unity
PDC Parti Democrate Chretien
PL Parti Liberal
UNDP United Nations Development Program
PSD Parti Social Democrate
RTLM Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
USA United States of America

Notes (From French -Original)

• Rapport de la commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda annexe 1 p.79.
• Lettre Ouverte au Sénateur Destexhe Novembre 1996 par Alain De Brouwer, Conseiller politique charge du secteur Afrique à l’IDC(de mars 1990 à Juin 1995) p.4.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi. “Rwanda. Du Génocide à la Défaite” p.69.
• Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda (COM-1-9).
• Voir lettre du Pilote de l’avion Falcon 50 annexe au rapport de la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Français.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi, “Rwanda. Du Génocide a la Défaite”, p.77-78.
• Alexandre Goffin, “Rwanda 7 Avril 1994: 10 Commandos vont mourir” p.23.
• Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda ( COM-R 1-15 & 1-72).
• Africa International no 272 Mai 1994, p.7.
• East African Alternatives March/April 1999 p.38-42.
• Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française Annexe p.265.
• Philip Reyntjens. “Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire”. p.45.
• Lettre du Professeur Reytgens du 10 Décembre 1998 a M. Bernard Cazeneuve, rapporteur de la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française, annexée au rapport.
• Filip Reyntjens, op. cit., p.42.
• Colette Braeckman, “Rwanda. Histoire d’un génocide” p.196.
• Déclaration de Faustin Twagiramungu devant la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française.
• Témoignage d’Alison Desforges dans l’affaire No ICTR-96-4-T, le Procureur contre Jean-Paul Akayesu, audience du 22 mai 1997, pp.44-45.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire Nº ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.65.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.70.
• Colette Braeckman, Rwanda “Histoire d’un génocide”. Fayard, Paris 1994, pp.188, 189.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.60.
• Cité par Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza dans “Rwanda. Le mythe du génocide tutsi planifié à l’épreuve de la justice internationale”, Arusha, Octobre 1998 (inédit).
• Témoignage d’Alison Desforges devant le TPIR, affaire No ICTR-96-4-T, le Procureur contre Paul Akayesu, transcrit de l’audience du 22 mai 1997, p44.
• Rapport de la Commission d’enquête du Sénat belge, Annexe 1, p. 197.
• Proceedings in Jean-Paul Akayesu trial at ICTR, 25 February 1998, p.52.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi, “Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite”, Edition Rebero, Kigali 1997, pp.77-78.
• “Rwanda. L’Armee Patriotique Rwandaise responsable d’homicides et d’enlèvements (avril-août 1994)”. Rapport d’Amnesty International, Londres, 20 Octobre 1994, INDEX AI: AFR 47/16/94, p.4.
• La position du FPR et des autorités de Kigali a été réaffirmé récemment par Tito Rutaremara, Député et idéologue extrémiste du FPR, lors du dernier anniversaire du génocide tutsi célebré au Rwanda. Son interview paraît dans le Journal gouvernemental Imvaho Nshya No 1278 du 5-11 avril 1999.
• Voir Proces-verbal du témoignage du Général Dallaire fait le 25 février 1998 au TPIR dans l’affaire le Procureur contre Jean-Paul Akayesu, No ICTR-96-4-T, p.124. Rapport de la Commission parlementaire belge sur le Rwanda (COM-R 1-63).
• Témoignage du Père Guy Theunis devant la Commission parlementaire belge (COM-R 1-68).
• Rapport de la Mission d’ Information Parlementaire Française, T I p. 234.
• Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/7 du 28 juin 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/12 du 12 août 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/70 du 11 novembre 1994.
• Doc. S/1994/1405 du 9 décembre 1994.
• Témoignage de Filip Reyntjens dans l’affaire No ICTR-96-3-I, le Procureur contre Georges Rutaganda, procès-verbal de l’audience du 13 Octobre 19997, p.17.
• Témoignage d’André Guichaoua dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, procès-verbal de l’audience du 15 novembre 1997, pp. 156-157. Notes
• Rapport de la commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda annexe 1 p.79.
• Lettre Ouverte au Sénateur Destexhe Novembre 1996 par Alain De Brouwer, Conseiller politique charge du secteur Afrique à l’IDC(de mars 1990 à Juin 1995) p.4.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi. “Rwanda. Du Génocide à la Défaite” p.69.
• Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda (COM-1-9).
• Voir lettre du Pilote de l’avion Falcon 50 annexe au rapport de la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Français.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi, “Rwanda. Du Génocide a la Défaite”, p.77-78.
• Alexandre Goffin, “Rwanda 7 Avril 1994: 10 Commandos vont mourir” p.23.
• Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Belge sur le Rwanda ( COM-R 1-15 & 1-72).
• Africa International no 272 Mai 1994, p.7.
• East African Alternatives March/April 1999 p.38-42.
• Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française Annexe p.265.
• Philip Reyntjens. “Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire”. p.45.
• Lettre du Professeur Reytgens du 10 Décembre 1998 a M. Bernard Cazeneuve, rapporteur de la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française, annexée au rapport.
• Filip Reyntjens, op. cit., p.42.
• Colette Braeckman, “Rwanda. Histoire d’un génocide” p.196.
• Déclaration de Faustin Twagiramungu devant la Mission d’Information Parlementaire Française.
• Témoignage d’Alison Desforges dans l’affaire No ICTR-96-4-T, le Procureur contre Jean-Paul Akayesu, audience du 22 mai 1997, pp.44-45.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire Nº ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.65.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.70.
• Colette Braeckman, Rwanda “Histoire d’un génocide”. Fayard, Paris 1994, pp.188, 189.
• Témoignage dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, transcrit du 05 Novembre 1998, p.60.
• Cité par Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza dans “Rwanda. Le mythe du génocide tutsi planifié à l’épreuve de la justice internationale”, Arusha, Octobre 1998 (inédit).
• Témoignage d’Alison Desforges devant le TPIR, affaire No ICTR-96-4-T, le Procureur contre Paul Akayesu, transcrit de l’audience du 22 mai 1997, p44.
• Rapport de la Commission d’enquête du Sénat belge, Annexe 1, p. 197.
• Proceedings in Jean-Paul Akayesu trial at ICTR, 25 February 1998, p.52.
• Ntaribi Kamanzi, “Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite”, Edition Rebero, Kigali 1997, pp.77-78.
• “Rwanda. L’Armee Patriotique Rwandaise responsable d’homicides et d’enlèvements (avril-août 1994)”. Rapport d’Amnesty International, Londres, 20 Octobre 1994, INDEX AI: AFR 47/16/94, p.4.
• La position du FPR et des autorités de Kigali a été réaffirmé récemment par Tito Rutaremara, Député et idéologue extrémiste du FPR, lors du dernier anniversaire du génocide tutsi célebré au Rwanda. Son interview paraît dans le Journal gouvernemental Imvaho Nshya No 1278 du 5-11 avril 1999.
• Voir Proces-verbal du témoignage du Général Dallaire fait le 25 février 1998 au TPIR dans l’affaire le Procureur contre Jean-Paul Akayesu, No ICTR-96-4-T, p.124. Rapport de la Commission parlementaire belge sur le Rwanda (COM-R 1-63).
• Témoignage du Père Guy Theunis devant la Commission parlementaire belge (COM-R 1-68).
• Rapport de la Mission d’ Information Parlementaire Française, T I p. 234.
• Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/7 du 28 juin 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/12 du 12 août 1994; Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/70 du 11 novembre 1994.
• Doc. S/1994/1405 du 9 décembre 1994.
• Témoignage de Filip Reyntjens dans l’affaire No ICTR-96-3-I, le Procureur contre Georges Rutaganda, procès-verbal de l’audience du 13 Octobre 19997, p.17.
• Témoignage d’André Guichaoua dans l’affaire No ICTR-95-I-T, le Procureur contre Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, procès-verbal de l’audience du 15 novembre 1997, pp. 156-157.